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INTRODUCTION 
In 2000, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked the world, “[I]f 
humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to 
gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept 
of our common humanity?”1  Thirteen years later, the international 
community still has not reached a consensus on this question.  In a 
September speech before the UN General Assembly on Syria’s use of 
chemical weapons, U.S. President Barack Obama echoed Annan’s query: 
 
Different nations will not agree on the need for action in every instance, 
and the principle of sovereignty is at the center of our international order.  
But sovereignty cannot be a shield for tyrants to commit wanton murder, 
or an excuse for the international community to turn a blind eye. . . .  
[S]hould we really accept the notion that the world is powerless in the 
face of a Rwanda or Srebrenica?2 
 
Due to the diplomatic resolution of the Syrian crisis, the international 
community again did not resolve this difficult issue.  Yet states have drawn 
firm lines in the sand on the appropriate contours of an international 
response to crises like Syria.  This Note traces the history and development 
of the responsibility to protect doctrine from its inception to the Syrian 
crisis and advocates for reform to better effectuate the doctrine’s ideals. 
 
 1.  KOFI A. ANNAN, WE THE PEOPLES: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 48 (2000), available at http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/wethepeople.pdf. 
 2.  Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, 2013 DAILY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 655, at 8 (Sept. 24, 2013). 
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I. THE PRE-UNITED NATIONS HISTORY OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 
Though many believe humanitarian intervention3 to be a product of 
the 1990s, it is widely considered to be a creation of the 19th century.4  
Throughout the 1800s, in addition to wars of conquest and colonialism, 
states engaged in wars with varying levels of humanitarian justifications.5  
Many of these interventions were undertaken by powerful European states 
to end massacres of Christian civilians in the territory of the Ottoman 
Empire.  British philhellenes steered the UK into a war to save the Greeks 
from extinction at the hands of the Ottoman Empire in the 1820s.6  In 1860, 
Napoleon III dispatched French legions to save Syrian Christians from 
being massacred by the Druze.7  In 1876, British newspapers implored 
Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli for intervention in Bulgaria, as reporters 
detailed the slaughter and burning of between 5000 and 25,000 Bulgarian 
villagers,8 mostly women and children, by Ottoman forces.9 
In the 1800s, the majority of scholars agreed that the use of force, 
 
 3.  Humanitarian intervention can be defined as action 
1. Carried out in, or intended to affect events within, a foreign state or states – it is an 
intervention; 
2. Aimed at the government of the target state(s), or imposed on and only accepted reluctantly 
by it/them – it is thus coercive, albeit not necessarily involving use of force; [and] 
3. Intended, at least nominally (and at least to some extent actually), to avert, halt, and/or 
prevent recurrence of large-scale mortality, mass atrocities, egregious human rights abuses or 
other widespread suffering caused by the action or deliberate inaction of the de facto 
authorities in the target state(s). 
D. J. B. Trim & Brendan Simms, Towards a History of Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION: A HISTORY 4 (Brendan Simms & D. J. B. Trim eds., 2011). 
 4.  Though one can argue that the Crusades were a type of religious humanitarian intervention (at 
least in the view of the Catholic Church), states only began justifying intervention in humanitarian 
terms in the nineteenth century.  Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of 
Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 203, 
205–06 (1974); see also GARY J. BASS, FREEDOM’S BATTLE: THE ORIGINS OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 5 (2008) (arguing that nineteenth-century European states were the first to undertake 
humanitarian interventions). 
 5.  For example, Greece (1827–1830), Syria (1860–1861), Crete (1866–1868), Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Bulgaria (1876–1878), and Macedonia (1903–1908, 1912–1913).  See Fonteyne, 
supra note 4, at 207–13 (describing each of these conflicts).  For a deeper look into humanitarian 
intervention in the 19th century, see generally BASS, supra note 4. 
 6.  BASS, supra note 4, at 47–49.  The Greek cause also inspired support from the American 
public and from prominent American politicians such as Thomas Jefferson.  Id. at 88–99.  Though such 
support pressured the Monroe administration to support the Greeks, the United States did not become 
involved in the conflict.  Id. 
 7.  Id. at 155–57. 
 8.  The newspapers disagreed dramatically on how many Bulgarians were killed.  Bass estimates 
it was “probably in the range of 12,000.”  Id. at 260. 
 9.  Id. at 256–265. 
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including humanitarian intervention, was legal under international law.10  
After the devastation of World War I, however, several powerful states 
created the League of Nations and agreed to end conquest, legally 
restricting the use of force for the first time.11  Between World War I and 
World War II, scholars debated whether humanitarian intervention had 
been assimilated into customary international law.12  After World War II, 
the United Nations further restricted the use of force and invested in a 
paradigm of collective security. 
II. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE UNITED 
NATIONS 
The UN Charter explicitly bans the threat of or use of force against 
another state.13  The only exceptions to this prohibition are actions in 
individual or collective self-defense14 or actions approved by the Security 
Council.15  As such, the Charter and international law do not permit 
retaliation for violations of international law norms or provide an 
enforcement mechanism for such violations.16  The Charter authorizes 
members to utilize regional security arrangements17 but prohibits such 
entities from taking enforcement actions without authorization from the 
Security Council.18 
The responsibility to protect was conceptualized under this framework 
of collective security by Francis Deng.19  Under this doctrine, Deng 
 
 10.  Fonteyne, supra note 4, at 223. 
 11.  See League of Nations Covenant arts. 10, 12, 15; see also CORNELIU BJOLA, LEGITIMISING 
THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: KOSOVO, IRAQ AND THE ETHICS OF INTERVENTION 
45–46 (2009) (noting that the Covenant of the League of Nations “represented the first serious attempt 
to legally restrict the use of force by formal means, although mainly through procedural, not 
substantive, provisions”). 
 12.  Fonteyne, supra note 4, at 223–26. 
 13.  U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 14.  U.N. Charter art. 51.  The parameters of self-defense or collective self-defense are interpreted 
restrictively.  See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, 77–79 (June 27) (rejecting the assertions of self-defense by the United States and adopting a 
narrow reading of justifiable self-defense under Chapter 51 and customary international law). 
 15.  U.N. Charter arts. 39–42. 
 16.  Michael N. Schmitt, The Syrian Intervention: Assessing the Possible International Law 
Justifications, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 744, 750 (2013). 
 17.  U.N. Charter art. 52. 
 18.  U.N. Charter art. 53, para. 1. 
 19.  See FRANCIS M. DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
IN AFRICA (1996).  Deng was appointed the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on 
Internally Displaced Persons in 1993.  ALEX J. BELLAMY, GLOBAL POLITICS AND THE RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT: FROM WORDS TO DEEDS 10 (2011).  At this post, he argued that states, as a part of their 
sovereign responsibility, are obligated to accept international aid when they are unable to provide for 
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emphasized the responsibility inherent in sovereignty.  He argued that at 
the core of this responsibility is the state’s obligation to protect its citizens 
from violence.20  If a state fails to protect its nationals from harm, the 
international community must undertake the responsibility to do so.21  
Subsequently, Secretary-General Annan endorsed Deng’s theory.  In the 
wake of the Kosovo intervention, he insisted that traditional notions of 
sovereignty have been redefined: “States are now widely understood to be 
instruments at the service of their peoples.”22  Implicit in this statement is 
the idea that sovereignty encompasses not only the privileges of power but 
also responsibilities to the citizenry. 
Two years later, after the UN’s failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda, 
Secretary-General Annan asked the international community to address 
humanitarian intervention.23  The result was Canada’s creation of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).24  
The ICISS brought the discourse on “sovereignty as responsibility” to the 
forefront and expanded and elaborated on Deng’s framework.  In its 2001 
Report, the ICISS identified three elements of the responsibility to 
protect,25 which are applicable to situations involving crimes that shock the 
conscience of mankind, such as genocide or ethnic cleansing.26  The first is 
the responsibility to prevent, under which states should tackle the root 
causes of conflicts before emergencies erupt.27  Under the second element, 
the responsibility to react, states should respond to crises through sanctions, 
military interventions, or other appropriate measures.28  The final element, 
the responsibility to rebuild, involves states providing assistance to states 
 
the well-being of their citizens.  Id. at 10–11; see also THERESA REINOLD, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE POWER OF NORMS AND THE NORMS OF THE POWERFUL 54–55 
(2013) (describing Deng’s theory as a “dual social contract” between a government and its citizens and 
between states and the international community). 
 20.  DENG ET AL., supra note 19, at 32–33. 
 21.  Id. at 212–23. 
 22.  Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1999, at 49, 49, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/324795. 
 23.  Press Release, General Assembly, Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General 
Assembly, U.N. Press Release GA/9596 (Sept. 20, 1999); see also INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT vii (2001), available at http://responsibilityto 
protect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf (describing Secretary-General Annan’s speech and the creation of the 
ICISS). 
 24.  INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 23, at vii. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 31. 
 27.  Id. at 19–23. 
 28.  Id. at 29–35. 
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recovering from crises.29 
Following the publication of the ICISS report, the responsibility to 
protect remained a topic of discussion within the international community 
and gained widespread support.  At the 2005 World Summit, 190 states 
produced an agreement declaring, in part, that every state has a 
responsibility to protect its citizenry and to prevent genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.30  Furthermore, should a 
state fail to uphold this mandate, the international community has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic and peaceful means to protect 
the civilian population.31  In the event that such means are inadequate, the 
Security Council should be prepared to take “timely and decisive” action in 
accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter.32  These commitments 
were affirmed by the Security Council in 2006 and reaffirmed by the 
General Assembly in 2009.33 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has also embraced the responsibility 
to protect, publishing three reports on its status and implementation.34  His 
conceptualization of the responsibility to protect contains three “pillars,” 
similar to the ICISS’ three elements.35  The pillars are non-sequential and 
of equal significance.36  The first pillar is the state’s responsibility to 
protect its citizenry, originating in the basic tenets of sovereignty.37  The 
second pillar revolves around the responsibility of the international 
community to help states fulfill the responsibilities described in the first 
pillar.38  The final pillar concerns intervention consistent with the UN 
Charter if a state is “manifestly failing” to protect its citizens as described 
 
 29.  Id. at 39–44. 
 30.  See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 
2005).  The World Summit Outcome was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly.  Alex 
Bellamy & Ruben Reike, The Responsibility to Protect and International Law, in THE RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 81, 89 (2011). 
 31.  G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 30, ¶ 139. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Bellamy & Reike, supra note 30, at 81. 
 34.  See U.N. Secretary-General, Early Warning, Assessment, and the Responsibility to Protect: 
Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/64/864 (July 14, 2010); U.N. Secretary-General, 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 
12, 2009) [hereinafter Implementing the Responsibility to Protect]; U.N. Secretary-General, The Role of 
Regional and Subregional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the 
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/65/877-S/2011/393 (June 28, 2011). 
 35.  See Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 34, ¶ 11. 
 36.  See BELLAMY, supra note 19, at 35. 
 37.  Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 34, ¶ 11(a).  The Secretary-General 
identifies four crimes that are at the core of a state’s protection responsibilities: genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  Id. ¶ 13. 
 38.  Id. ¶ 11(b). 
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in the first pillar.39  Like the World Summit Outcome and the ICISS report, 
Secretary-General Ban’s reports assigned exclusive rights to authorize an 
intervention under the responsibility to protect to the UN Security 
Council.40 
III. INTERVENTION IN PRACTICE 
The Security Council has been bitterly divided over whether 
humanitarian intervention is justified by the responsibility to protect, 
especially with respect to unilateral intervention.41  Indeed, the 
responsibility to protect has been described as “the most difficult thematic 
debate in the Security Council.”42  This discord has been reflected in 
several conflicts over the last two decades.  Several interventions, both 
through the Security Council and through unilateral action, have been 
justified on humanitarian grounds.43  In other instances, the international 
community has failed to intervene during or prevent the commission of 
devastating human rights violations, including genocide.44  The following 
section highlights this debate. 
A. Kosovo 
In the late 1990s, tensions between the various ethnic groups of the 
former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) escalated into civil war.45  
As the state dissolved, the UN was unable to prevent ethnic cleansing, 
widespread bloodshed, and horrific war crimes from sweeping across the 
region.46  Kosovo, a small region in the FRY, was pulled into the violent 
political vacuum.47  After failing to prevent atrocities in neighboring 
Balkan states, the Security Council passed a series of Chapter VII 
 
 39.  Id. ¶ 11(c). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  In this Note, unilateral action refers to both intervention undertaken by collective security 
arrangements, such as NATO, and individual state action. 
 42.  REINOLD, supra note 19, at 61. 
 43.  See S.C. Res. 940, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (Jul. 31, 1994); S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992); S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (Apr. 5, 1991). 
 44.  See infra Part III.C. 
 45.  For a more detailed history of the conflict, see generally Marie-Janine Calic, Kosovo in the 
Twentieth Century: A Historical Account, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION: SELECTIVE INDIGNATION, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP 19 
(Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur eds., 2000). 
 46.  Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur, Kosovo, the Changing Contours of World Politics, and 
the Challenge of World Order, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: 
SELECTIVE INDIGNATION, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 45, at 1, 
2–7. 
 47.  Id. 
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enforcement resolutions attempting to address the violent conditions in 
Kosovo.48  The resolutions described the situation in Kosovo as a threat to 
international peace and security, but the Security Council could not agree 
on a course of action.49 
Meanwhile, the human rights situation in Kosovo was deteriorating.  
The NATO states, weary of the UN’s failure to prevent the massacre in 
Srebrenica,50 were growing restless.  U.S. President Bill Clinton cited 
human rights concerns in 46% of the hundreds of remarks that he made 
justifying intervention in Kosovo.51  After failed peace efforts, NATO 
began to discuss a limited air campaign against the Serbian forces accused 
of terrorizing the civilian population.52  Before initiating airstrikes, 
Germany, France, and the UK preferred to secure authorization for the use 
of force from the Security Council, while the United States argued that 
NATO independently possessed the legitimacy to use force.53  U.S. 
National Security Advisor Sandy Bergen, articulating the Clinton 
administration’s position, stated, “We always prefer to operate pursuant to 
a U.N. resolution.  But we’ve always taken the position that NATO has the 
authority in situations it considers to be threats to the stability and security 
of its area to act by consensus without explicit U.N. authority.”54  After 
further diplomatic measures failed, NATO began a bombing campaign in 
Kosovo.55 
Russia and China harshly criticized NATO’s military strikes.  Russian 
officials, nevertheless, arguably pushed the NATO powers into 
independent action.  In private, Russian diplomats reportedly assured 
NATO foreign ministers, “If you take it the UN we’ll veto it.  If you don’t 
 
 48.  See S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998) (demanding cooperation with 
OSCE and NATO verification missions); S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (Sept. 23, 1998) 
(expressing “deep[] concern” and calling for a ceasefire); S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 
31, 1998) (imposing an arms embargo under Chapter VII). 
 49.  TIM JUDAH, KOSOVO: WAR AND REVENGE 182–85 (2000) (describing the conflicting 
positions of the permanent five Security Council members before NATO initiated its bombing 
campaign). 
 50.  In July of 1995, the UN “safe area” protecting Srebrenica collapsed, and 8000 Muslim 
civilians were massacred.  Id. at 120. 
 51.  NICHOLAS KERTON-JOHNSON, JUSTIFYING AMERICA’S WARS: THE CONDUCT AND PRACTICE 
OF US MILITARY INTERVENTION 63–64 (2011). 
 52.  JUDAH, supra note 49, at 121. 
 53.  For a discussion of the positions of the permanent five Security Council members (the P5) 
and other states in the Kosovo debate, see generally KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION: SELECTIVE INDIGNATION, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP, 
supra note 45, at 83–148. 
 54.  Sandy Berger, Nat’l Sec. Advisor, United States, Press Briefing (Mar. 25, 1999) (transcript 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47833). 
 55.  Schnabel & Thakur, supra note 46, at 4. 
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we’ll just denounce you. . . .  [W]e’ll just make a lot of noise.”56  Publicly, 
Russian officials condemned the NATO campaign, arguing, “Enforcement 
elements have been excluded from the draft resolution, and there are no 
provisions in it that would directly or indirectly sanction the automatic use 
of force.”57  Russia submitted to the Security Council a draft resolution 
describing NATO actions as a “flagrant violation of the United Nations 
Charter,”58 which was defeated by twelve votes to three.59  China similarly 
condemned NATO action, maintaining, “When the sovereignty of a 
country is put in jeopardy, its human rights can hardly be protected 
effectively.  Sovereign equality, mutual respect for State sovereignty and 
non-interference in the internal affairs of others are the basic principles 
governing international relations today.”60 
After NATO action ceased, the UN created the Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo to investigate the intervention.61  The 
Commission concluded that NATO intervention was “illegal but 
legitimate.”62  It further determined that “the intervention [had been] 
justified because all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted and because 
the intervention had [had] the effect of liberating the majority population of 
Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule.”63  In order to 
better respond to future crises, the Commission encouraged the 
international community to work through the UN and to close the gap 
between legality and legitimacy.64 
B. Libya 
The conflict began in February 2011, as protests against General 
Muammar Qaddafi’s regime spread to cities throughout Libya.65  General 
 
 56.  JUDAH, supra note 49, at 183. 
 57.  U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3937th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3937 (Oct. 24, 1998). 
 58.  S.C. Res. 328, U.N. Doc. S/1999/328 (Mar. 26, 1999); Press Release, Security Council, 
Security Council Rejects Demand for Cessation of Use of Force Against Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, U.N. Press Release SC/6659 (Mar. 26, 1999). 
 59.  U.N. Press Release SC/6659, supra note 58.  China, Namibia, and Russia voted for the 
Resolution.  Id.  Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, France, Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia, the 
Netherlands, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, and the United States rejected the resolution.  Id. 
 60.  U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 8th plen. mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.8 (Sept. 22 1999). 
 61.  INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 14 (2000), available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/ 
resources/6D26FF88119644CFC1256989005CD392-thekosovoreport.pdf. 
 62.  Id. at 4. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 10–11. 
 65.  Aidan Hehir, Introduction: Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, in LIBYA: THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE FUTURE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 1, 1–11 (Aidan 
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Muammar Qaddafi responded violently, and his forces killed dozens of 
demonstrators.66  On February 20, 2011, the protests escalated into 
rebellion, and rebel forces captured several Libyan cities, including 
Benghazi.67  In response to General Qaddafi’s threats to take action against 
civilians, the Security Council passed Resolution 1973, which implemented 
a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace and authorized Member States to “take 
all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians.68  NATO airstrikes, led 
by the United States, France, and the UK, commenced hours after the 
resolution was passed.69 
The United States defended the legitimacy and desirability of such 
strikes on humanitarian grounds.  President Obama argued, “[W]hen 
someone like Qaddafi threatens a bloodbath that could destabilize an entire 
region; and when the international community is prepared to come together 
to save many thousands of lives—then it’s in our national interest to act.  
And it’s our responsibility.  This is one of those times.”70  Echoing the 
president, State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh advised the 
American Society of International Law that 
 
[Qaddafi’s] illegitimate use of force not only is causing the deaths of 
substantial numbers of civilians among his own people, but also is 
forcing many others to flee to neighboring countries . . . .  Qaddafi has 
forfeited his responsibility to protect his own citizens and created a 
serious need for immediate humanitarian assistance and protection . . . .71 
 
Other states, however, did not support Western military intervention.  
Russia and China, along with several developing states, were infuriated 
about the extent of NATO air strikes, contending that NATO states 
overextended Resolution 1973’s civilian protections as a pretext for Libyan 
regime change.72  Some commentators argued that advocates of the Libyan 
 
Hehir & Robert Murray eds., 2013). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).  Russia and China abstained 
from voting on the resolution.  Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approves “No-Fly 
Zone” over Libya, Authorizing “All Necessary Measures” to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour 
with 5 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011). 
 69.  David D. Kirkpatrick et al., Allies Open Air Assault on Qaddafi’s Forces in Libya, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/20/world/africa/20libya.html. 
 70.  The President’s Weekly Address, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 203, at 1 (Mar. 26, 2011). 
 71.  Harold Hongku Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Statement Regarding Use of Force 
in Libya before the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting (Mar. 26, 2011) (emphasis 
added) (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/159201.htm). 
 72.  Simon Tisdell, The Consensus on Intervention in Libya Has Shattered, GUARDIAN, Mar. 23, 
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intervention had impaired the development of the responsibility to protect 
by intensifying Russian and Chinese distrust of humanitarian 
interventions.73  Further, others believed that the Obama administration and 
other NATO states had wrongly applied the responsibility to protect.74 
C. Genocide—and the Responsibility to Protect—Ignored? 
While the success of the international efforts to alleviate human rights 
violations in Kosovo and Libya are debatable, the international community 
has wholly failed to respond to several other severe human rights 
violations.75  Secretary-General Annan created an independent inquiry into 
the UN’s failed response to the Rwandan genocide.76  The inquiry 
determined that over the course of about 100 days in the spring of 1994, 
approximately 800,000 Rwandans were killed.77  According to the inquiry, 
the international community’s failure to prevent or to stop those killings 
was attributable to a “persistent lack of political will by Member States to 
act, or to act with enough assertiveness.”78  This lack of political will—and, 
in some cases, the presence of political opposition—characterizes the 
failure to act in several of the most severe human rights violations since 
World War II. 
The complicated conflict in Sudan also tested the international 
community’s resolve in the face of significant civilian causalities, a pattern 
of human rights abuses, and substantial internal displacement.79  The 
 
2011, 11:11 EDT, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/23/libya-ceasefire-consensus-
russia-china-india. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  See, e.g., Steven Groves, Obama Wrongly Adopts U.N. “Responsibility to Protect” to Justify 
Libya Intervention, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/ 
03/libya-intervention-obama-wrongly-adopts-un-responsibility-to-protect (arguing that R2P could 
constrain future U.S. action); David Rieff, Op-Ed., R2P, R.I.P., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html (arguing that NATO “distorted” the doctrine, 
threatening the legitimacy of the international system). 
 75.  Though it occurred before ICISS’s report, the international community’s response to the 
Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia is also notable in this regard.  When Vietnam intervened in 
Cambodia to oust Pol Pot from power, approximately 800,000 Cambodians had been killed.  Sophie 
Quinn-Judge, Fraternal Aid, Self-Defence, or Self-Interest? Vietnam’s Intervention in Cambodia, in 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A HISTORY, supra note 3, at 343, 343–62.  Thousands more were 
starving and/or enslaved.  Id.  Yet, the coup was almost universally condemned.  Id. 
 76.  U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Mar. 18, 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to 
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1999/339 (Mar. 26, 1999). 
 77.  Indep. Inquiry into the Actions of the U.N. During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, Rep., 
transmitted by letter dated Dec. 15, 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec. 15, 1999). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Situation of Human Rights in the Darfur Region of the 
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conflict was centered in Darfur, a region of Western Sudan where 
desertification and drought had led to starvation and underdevelopment.80  
The Sudanese government was unable or unwilling to alleviate the 
suffering in Darfur, and as a result, unrest in the area grew.81  Tension 
between non-Arab and Arab tribes over access to resources mounted.82  In 
2003, violence escalated, and two non-Arab rebel groups, the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), 
declared an open rebellion against the government.83  In response, the 
Sudanese government employed Arab tribal militias84 to supplement the 
army and to quash the JEM and SLM uprising.85  A UN report found that 
“the armed forces and their proxy militias punished certain populations 
collectively for belonging to the same ethnic group as the rebels, and 
inflicted terror upon them.”86  Despite recent peace agreements and the 
partition of the country into two states, violence has continued, and the 
region remains unstable.87  The UN estimates that 300,000 Sudanese have 
died as a result of the violence, and 2.7 million Sudanese are displaced,88 
 
Sudan, at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/3 (May 7, 2004). 
 80.  See generally NOAH R. BASSIL, THE POST-COLONIAL STATE AND CIVIL WAR IN SUDAN: THE 
ORIGINS OF CONFLICT IN DARFUR (2013) (providing a more detailed account of the origins and 
complexities of the conflict in Darfur). 
 81.  REINOLD, supra note 19, at 66–67. 
 82.  Id.  Racial and religious tensions were not new problems in Sudan.  British colonizers had 
stitched together a diverse group of ethnicities and tribes among arbitrary boundaries and ruled Sudan 
as two states.  See KWASI KWARTENG, GHOSTS OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN’S LEGACIES IN THE MODERN 
WORLD 253–72 (2011) (describing Britain’s partition and colonization of Sudan).  Colonialism 
undermined the creation of a national Sudanese identity and instead produced tribalism, segregation, 
and racism among the Sudanese citizenry.  BASSIL, supra note 80, at 88. 
 83.  BASSIL, supra note 80, at 88.  The conflict was, however, far more complicated than a racial 
or religious war.  Id. at 1–2.  Race and religion were important factors in the conflict, but there were 
other issues involved.  The Islamist state had alienated the periphery of the country and lacked complete 
control.  Id. 
 84.  REINOLD, supra note 19, at 67 (describing the indiscriminate use by many militias of a 
“scorched earth” policy against civilians and rebels); Julie Flint, Beyond ‘Janjaweed:’ Understanding 
the Militias of Darfur (Small Arms Survey, Human Sec. Baseline Assessment, Working Paper No. 17, 
2009), available at http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-
17-Beyond-Janjaweed.pdf (describing the Arab militias’ composition of nomadic Arab tribesman, 
radicalized Islamists, former criminals, and the unemployed). 
 85.  See U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 79, at 3, 6 (noting that the Sudanese 
government initially denied supporting or arming the militias but that its use of the militias has been 
well-documented by the UN). 
 86.  Id. at 17. 
 87.  Rick Gladstone, Number of Darfur’s Displaced Surged in 2013, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/world/africa/number-of-darfurs-displaced-surged-in-2013.html; 
Nicholas Kulish, Civilians Trying to Flee South Sudan Violence Are Caught Between Two Sides, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/29/world/africa/south-sudan.html?_r=0. 
 88.  UN Welcomes Accord Signed Between Sudan and Darfur Rebel Group, UN NEWS CENTRE 
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with 300,000 citizens displaced in 2013 alone.89 
Despite international media attention and widespread calls for 
intervention, UN Member States lacked the political commitment to invoke 
the responsibility to protect or to take any decisive action to prevent these 
ongoing widespread human rights violations.90  Limited UN intervention, 
such as the supervised disarmament of Arab militias, deployment of a 
limited number of specially trained troops, and/or the enforcement of a no-
fly zone, could have mitigated or prevented the crisis.91  This lack of action 
led one scholar to remark, “If Darfur is the first ‘test case’ of the 
responsibility to protect, there is no point in denying that the world has 
failed the entry exam.”92 
IV. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND SYRIA 
On August 21, 2013, a chemical weapons attack was perpetrated 
against Syrian citizens in the Ghouta region of Damascus.93  According to 
reports, this incident was the culmination of a series of chemical attacks 
perpetrated by the Assad regime against Syrian civilians.94  Syria’s use of 
chemical weapons violated its treaty commitments and customary 
international law; the 1925 Geneva Protocol95 and the 1993 Chemical 
 
(July 14, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39044&Cr=Darfur&Cr1. 
 89.  U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United 
Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, ¶ 74, U.N. Doc. S/2013/420 (July 12, 2013). 
 90.  See EKKEHARD STRAUSS, THE EMPEROR’S NEW CLOTHES?: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 116–17 (2009) (arguing that the absence of 
political will led to a UN response that lacked “any coherent strategy”). 
 91.  See INT’L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT NO. 89, DARFUR: THE FAILURE TO PROTECT i–iii 
(2005), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/Darfur%20 
The%20Failure%20to%20Protect.pdf (recommending various measures to respond to the crisis). 
 92.  LEE FEINSTEIN, DARFUR AND BEYOND: WHAT IS NEEDED TO PREVENT MASS ATROCITIES 1, 
38 (Council on Foreign Relations, CSR No. 22, 2007), available at http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/ 
attachments/DarfurCSR22.pdf. 
 93.  United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the 
Syrian Arab Republic, Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of 
Damascus on 21 August 2013, transmitted by letter dated Sept. 13, 2013 addressed to the Secretary-
General, available at http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/Secretary_General_Report_ 
of_CW_Investigation.pdf (finding evidence of sarin gas use in the Ghouta region).  While the 
international community has almost universally condemned these attacks, the Assad regime vehemently 
denied that it is responsible.  Brian Stelter, Assad Denies Chemical Attack in Interview for U.S. Viewers, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/business/media/assad-denies-attack-in-
interview-with-charlie-rose.html?_r=0. 
 94.  See, e.g., Letter from Jon Day, Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee, to David Cameron, 
Prime Minister, United Kingdom, Syria: Reported Chemical Weapons Use (Aug. 29, 2013), available 
at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/235094/Jp_115_JD_ 
PM_Syria_Reported_Chemical_Weapon_Use_with_annex.pdf. 
 95.  Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, 
O'DONNELL MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2014  11:28 PM 
570 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 24:557 
Weapons Convention96 explicitly ban the use of chemical weapons, 
although they contain no enforcement provisions. 
Yet even before the use of chemical weapons, tension among the 
Security Council powers over Syria was mounting.  Russia and China 
vetoed several resolutions authorizing sanctions on the Assad regime.97  
After the third veto, the British ambassador, Sir Mark Lyall Grant, stated 
that the UK was “appalled by the decision of Russia and China to veto this 
resolution aimed at ending the bloodshed in Syria.”98  U.S. ambassador 
Susan Rice stated that the vote reflected that “two permanent members of 
the Council are prepared to defend Assad to the bitter end.”99  The chemical 
weapons attacks further increased tensions in the Security Council.  Before 
a diplomatic solution100 was reached, the governments of the permanent 
members articulated starkly different policy positions.  This section traces 
the views of the permanent members of the Security Council (the P5) on 
the responsibility to protect and concludes by examining the ways in which 
these positions have affected the doctrine. 
A. The United States 
The United States’ response to the responsibility to protect has varied 
by administration.  The Clinton administration was the first to engage with 
the responsibility to protect as articulated by the ICISS and Secretary-
General Annan,101 seeming to endorse a neo-Wilsonian worldview with 
 
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571. 
 96.  Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45. 
 97.  Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Syria 
That Would Have Threatened Sanctions, Due to Negative Votes of China, Russian Federation, U.N. 
Press Release SC/10714 (July 19, 2012). 
 98.  Rick Gladstone, Friction at the U.N. as Russia and China Veto Another Resolution on Syria 
Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/20/world/middleeast/russia-
and-china-veto-un-sanctions-against-syria.html. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  See S.C. Res. 2118, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2118 (Sept. 27, 2013) (condemning the use of chemical 
weapons in Syria and authorizing a UN-led team to destroy Syrian chemical stockpiles). 
 101.  However, the United States has long debated the merits of humanitarian justifications for 
military action.  For example, in 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt argued that the United States has 
a duty to intervene when crimes committed abroad are “‘so vast a scale and of such peculiar horror,” 
that “[i]n extreme cases action may be justifiable and proper,” and that “we could interfere by force of 
arms . . . to put a stop to intolerable conditions.”  BASS, supra note 4, at 3.  Similarly, President William 
McKinley declared, “The American people never shirk a responsibility and never unload a burden that 
carries forward civilization.”  Mike Sewell, Humanitarian Intervention, Democracy, and Imperialism: 
The American War with Spain, 1898, and After, in  HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A HISTORY, supra 
note 3, at 303.  Contrast President McKinley’s and President Roosevelt’s statements with the realist 
perspective of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who, after the Kosovo intervention, admonished 
British Prime Minister Tony Blair for not respecting traditional sovereignty principles.  BASS, supra 
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respect to intervention and the use of force.102  Some commentators labeled 
this the Clinton Doctrine, namely “that the United States cannot respond to 
all humanitarian disasters and human rights transgressions, but that it will 
use its power and good offices if doing so will make a difference and the 
costs are acceptable.”103 
In contrast, the Bush administration was far more skeptical of the 
responsibility to protect and humanitarian intervention.  Though it never 
“flatly rejected” the responsibility to protect, it demonstrated reluctance to 
be “forced to save strangers.”104  Further, UN ambassador John Bolton 
stated, “[T]his so-called right of humanitarian intervention . . . is just a 
gleam in one beholder’s eye but looks like flat-out aggression to someone 
else.”105 
Throughout his term in office, President Obama has been vague about 
his administration’s perspective on the legality of humanitarian 
intervention without a Security Council Resolution.106  Throughout the 
Syrian crisis, the importance that the Obama administration seemed to 
attach in its use of force calculus to the use of chemical weapons became 
evident.107  In August 2012, President Obama, albeit in an unscripted 
 
note 4, at 11.  Similarly, Kissinger had no qualms about dealing with the Khmer Rouge, advising a 
colleague, “Tell the Cambodians that we will be friends with them.  They are murderous thugs, but we 
won’t let that stand in our way.”  Id. at 11–12. 
 102.  Tony Smith, Wilsonianism, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 617 
(Alexander DeConde et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) (noting that after World War I, Wilson forcefully argued 
that the United States should prioritize the promotion abroad of democratic governance and of national 
self-determination). 
 103.  G. John Ikenberry, The Costs of Victory: American Power and the Use of Force in the 
Contemporary Order, in KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: SELECTIVE 
INDIGNATION, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND INTERNATIONAL CITIZENSHIP, supra note 45, at 85, 87.  
President Clinton stated, “[W]here we can, at an acceptable cost . . . we ought to prevent the slaughter 
of innocent civilians and the wholesale uprooting of them because of their race, their ethnic 
background, or the way they worship God.”  Interview with Jim Lehrer of PBS’ “Newshour,” 1999 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1091, 1095–96.  As discussed in Section IV, the Clinton administration 
demonstrated this worldview through interventions in Somalia and Kosovo. 
 104.  REINOLD, supra note 19, at 61–62 (noting that the Bush administration sought to prevent 
opinio juris from forming around the concept).  In short, the Bush administration wished to preserve the 
freedom to intervene without the obligation to do so.  Id. 
 105.  BASS, supra note 4, at 15. 
 106.  However, even before the use of chemical weapons, the Obama administration endorsed the 
possibility of intervention in Syria without a Security Council resolution.  For example, Secretary of 
Defense Leon Panetta used a NATO-led force as an example of a legally sound basis for intervention.  
Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Situation in Syria Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 112th 
Cong. 43–45 (2012) (statement of Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense, United States) (citing NATO’s 
Bosnia intervention as legally sound precedent under international law). 
 107.  Here, the administration could have been seeking to combine humanitarian justifications with 
national security interests on arms control.  See Krista Nelson, Syria Insta-Symposium: The Significance 
of Chemical Weapons Use Under International Law, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 6, 2013, 1:30 PM EDT), 
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comment, described the transport or use of chemical weapons as a “red 
line” that would alter his position on the situation in Syria.108  He seemed to 
suggest that the universal acceptance in the international community of the 
chemical weapons ban and the longevity of this consensus factor into his 
analysis of the use of force without a Security Council authorization.109  In 
a UN speech, he argued that the international community must 
“meaningfully enforce a prohibition whose origins are older than the 
United Nations itself.”110 
The American push for action met with fierce opposition from other 
states, including Russia and China.111  This discord led the Obama 
administration to express willingness to act outside a Security Council 
mandate.  President Obama opined, “[G]iven Security Council paralysis on 
this issue, if we are serious about upholding a ban on chemical weapons 
use, then an international response is required and that will not come 
through Security Council action.”112  Shortly after making this statement, 
the White House circulated a joint statement supporting the President’s 
position, signed by eleven of the G20 nations.113  In part, this statement 
warned, “The world cannot wait for endless failed processes that can only 
lead to increased suffering in Syria and regional instability.”114  However, 
 
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/09/06/syria-insta-symposium-significance-chemical-weapons-use-
international-law/ (describing the Obama administration’s use of arms control and humanitarian 
justifications when calling for action in Syria). 
 108.   See The President’s News Conference, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 656, at 6 (Aug. 20, 
2012).  In a press meeting the following day, the administration did not discredit this characterization.  
See Josh Earnest, Principal Deputy Press Sec’y, White House, Press Gaggle en route Columbus, OH 
(Aug. 21, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/21/press-
gaggle-principal-deputy-press-secretary-josh-earnest-en-route-colu).  Subsequently, President Obama 
characterized the red line as the world’s “red line.”  The President’s News Conference with Prime 
Minister John Fredrik Reinfeldt of Sweden in Stockholm, Sweden, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 599, 
at 6 (Sept. 4, 2013). 
 109.  See 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 655, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that the chemical weapons 
ban “has been agreed to by 98 percent of humanity and “is strengthened by the searing memories of 
soldiers suffocating in the trenches; Jews slaughtered in gas chambers; Iranians poisoned in the many 
tens of thousands”); 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 599, supra note 108 (describing the President’s 
views and “calculus” on Syria). 
 110.  2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 655, supra note 2, at 2. 
 111.  Syria Crisis: Russia and China Step up Warning over Strike, BBC NEWS (Aug. 27, 2013, 
05:52 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-23845800. 
 112.  The President’s News Conference in St. Petersburg, Russia, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
606, at 3 (Sept. 6, 2013). 
 113.  See Joint Statement by the United States of America, the Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canada, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, and the United Kingdom, 2013 DAILY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 607 (Sept. 6, 2013). 
 114.  Id. at 1. 
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the Obama administration found few states with the resources and political 
will to contribute to military action and began to make preparations to act 
alone.115 
Political obstacles faced by the Obama administration further 
obscured the U.S. position on the responsibility to protect.  Perhaps as a 
result of underwhelming support from the international community, 
President Obama announced that he would seek approval from Congress116 
for military action against Syria.117  Even limited military intervention 
proved to be unpopular with the American public, making congressional 
support for action improbable.118  Further, critics argued that seeking 
congressional approval made President Obama, and by extension the 
United States, appear “weak” to the international community.119  Others 
maintained that President Obama’s actions were indicative of his 
 
 115.  See Mark Lander et al., Obama Set for Limited Strike on Syria as British Vote No, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/30/us/politics/obama-syria.html (reporting that 
after Prime Minister Cameron lost the vote, U.S. officials emphasized that “eroding support would not 
deter Mr. Obama”).  Further, the Navy moved a fifth destroyer into the eastern Mediterranean Sea.  Id. 
 116.  Scholars debate whether such approval is necessary under the Constitution.  Compare Charles 
A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 701 
(1972) (“Evidence from the years immediately following ratification of the Constitution thus 
corroborates the conclusion that Americans originally understood Congress to have at least a 
coordinate, and probably the dominant, role in initiating all but the most obviously defensive wars, 
whether declared or not.”), with John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The 
Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 174 (1996) (“The Framers established 
a system which was designed to encourage presidential initiative in war, but which granted Congress an 
ultimate check on executive actions.  Congress could express its opposition to executive war decisions 
only by exercising its powers over funding and impeachment. . . .  The President was seen as the 
protector and representative of the People.  In contrast, the Framers expressed a deep concern regarding 
the damage that Congress, and the interest groups that could dominate it, might cause in the delicate 
areas of war and foreign policy.”). 
 117.  Peter Baker & Jonathan Weisman, Obama Seeks Approval by Congress for Strike in Syria, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/world/middleeast/syria.html; see also 
Letter to Congressional Leaders Transmitting Draft Legislation Regarding Authorization for Use of 
United States Armed Forces in Connection with the Conflict in Syria, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
597 (Aug. 31, 2013). 
 118.  President Obama faced difficulty advocating for intervention in Syria to the international 
community and domestically.  See CABLE NEWS NETWORK & ORC, POLL 8, INTERVIEWS WITH 1,022 
ADULT AMERICANS CONDUCTED BY TELEPHONE (2013), available at http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/ 
2013/images/09/09/6a.poll.syria.pdf (finding that less than half of Americans supported military 
intervention, 69% believed that intervention was not in the interest of the United States, and 72% 
believed that intervention would not accomplish significant American goals). 
 119.  See, e.g., Thom Shanker & Lauren D’Avolio, Former Defense Secretaries Criticize Obama 
on Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/world/middleeast/gates-
and-panetta-critical-of-obama-on-syria.html (“[Former Defense Secretary Leon] Panetta said that the 
president ‘has to retain the responsibility and the authority on this issue,’ and that it was wrong to 
‘subcontract’ the decision to Congress.”).  The article also quotes Panetta saying, “[T]here’s no question 
in my mind [Iran is] looking at the situation, and what they are seeing right now is an element of 
weakness.”  Id. 
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unwillingness to take full political responsibility for a Syrian 
intervention.120  To pitch the President’s position, Secretary of State John 
Kerry presented the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with a draft 
resolution authorizing the use of force.121  During his remarks, Secretary 
Kerry seemed to make a responsibility to protect-based appeal, stating, 
“This is not the time for armchair isolationism.  This is not the time to be 
spectators to slaughter.”122 
B. The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom, unlike the United States, has explicitly endorsed 
the responsibility to protect as a legal basis for the use of force, with or 
without a Security Council resolution.123  During the Balkan War in the late 
1990s, the United Kingdom defended NATO actions as a legal 
humanitarian intervention.  During Security Council debates, the United 
Kingdom’s representative argued that “[t]he action being taken was 
legal . . . .  It was justified as an exceptional measure to prevent an 
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. . . .  [T]here was convincing 
evidence that such a catastrophe was imminent.”124 
After the chemical attacks in Syria, the British government elaborated 
on its Kosovo position.  The Prime Minister’s Office circulated a 
memorandum outlining three conditions for humanitarian intervention: 
 
(i) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international 
community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, 
requiring immediate and urgent relief; 
(ii) it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to 
the use of force if lives are to be saved; and 
 
 120.  See, e.g., Eric Posner, Obama is Only Making His War Powers Mightier, SLATE (Sept. 3, 
2013, 1:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/09/obama_ 
going_to_congress_on_syria_he_s_actually_strengthening_the_war_powers.html (“The president’s 
announcement should be understood as a political move, not a legal one. . . .  If Congress now approves 
the war, it must share blame with the president if what happens next in Syria goes badly.  If Congress 
rejects the war, it must share blame with the president if Bashar al-Assad gases more Syrian children.”). 
 121.  John Kerry, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Opening Remarks Before the United States 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Sept. 3, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/ 
secretary/remarks/2013/09/212603.htm). 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Guidance: Chemical Weapons Use by Syrian Regime: UK Government Legal Position, PRIME 
MINISTER’S OFFICE (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-
use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-
government-legal-position-html-version [hereinafter Syrian Guidance]. 
 124.  Press Release, Security Council, NATO Action Against Serbian Military Targets Prompts 
Divergent Views as Security Council Holds Urgent Meeting on Situation in Kosovo 9–10, U.N. Press 
Release SC/6657 (Mar. 24, 1999). 
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(iii) the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the 
aim of relief of humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time 
and scope to this aim (i.e. the minimum necessary to achieve that end 
and for no other purpose).125 
 
However, the British Parliament foreclosed direct military 
involvement in Syria by defeating an authorizing resolution.126 
C. France 
France has been one of the most vocal advocates of the responsibility 
to protect.  In 2009, Ambassador Ripert explained, “France is particularly 
attached to the concrete implementation of the concept of the responsibility 
to protect.  It is an ambitious concept: It calls for intervening not only at the 
height of crises to stop the most atrocious crimes.  It calls for acting in 
advance to prevent them.”127  With the support of the Security Council,128 
France sent military forces into Mali to prevent humanitarian catastrophes 
and to regain control of the northern part of the country, where Al-Qaeda-
backed Islamists had imposed sharia law.129  At a General Assembly 
dialogue on the responsibility to protect, Ambassador Araud called for 
action in Syria: 
 
[T]he Syrian government is in the process of murdering its own people.  
More than 100,000 people have died.  The Syrian government, while 
showing complete indifference, used its air assets and then artillery 
against civilian neighborhoods, in violation of international humanitarian 
law, and is now using chemical weapons.  It first of all tested the waters 
by using them in a limited way.  It’s now using them on a massive scale, 
which doesn’t surprise anyone.  I would like to reiterate that all our 
meetings focusing on “never again” will do absolutely nothing to 
respond to the brutality of a regime that wants to murder its own 
people.130 
 
 125.  Syrian Guidance, supra note 123. 
 126.  Lander et al., supra note 115. 
 127.  Jean-Maurice Ripert, Permanent Representative of Fr. to the United Nations, Statement on the 
Protection of Civilians (Jan. 14, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.franceonu.org/france-at-the-
united-nations/press-room/statements-at-open-meetings/security-council/january-2009-1025/article/14-
january-2009-debate-on-the) [hereinafter Ripert Statement]. 
 128.  S.C. Res. 2085, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2085 (Dec. 20, 2012). 
 129.  Adam Nossiter & Eric Schmitt, France Battling Islamists in Mali, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/12/world/africa/mali-islamist-rebels-france.html. 
 130.  Gérard Araud, Permanent Representative of Fr. to the United Nations, Statement on Informal 
Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect (Sept. 11, 2013) (transcript available at http:// 
www.franceonu.org/france-at-the-united-nations/press-room/statements-at-open-meetings/general-
assembly/article/11-september-2013-general-assembly). 
O'DONNELL MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2014  11:28 PM 
576 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 24:557 
 
France also led a UN-sanctioned military campaign in the Central 
African Republic (CAR) to prevent escalating retaliatory attacks between 
the Muslim and Christian populations.131  Further, in an effort to prevent 
gridlock, France has argued that permanent Security Council members 
should refrain from using vetoes when mass atrocities have occurred.132 
D. China 
From the outset, China has flatly rejected the reconceptualization of 
sovereignty advocated by Secretary-General Annan and proponents of the 
responsibility to protect.  It believes that “opposition to international 
intervention is consistent with internationally recognized standards of 
morality, international law, and pragmatism.”133  During a 2009 General 
Assembly debate, Ambassador Liu Zhenmin stated: 
 
[T]he implementation of “R2P” [the responsibility to protect] should not 
contravene the principle of state sovereignty and the principle of non-
interference of internal affairs [of States].  Although the world has 
undergone complex and profound changes . . . .  [t]here must not be any 
wavering over the principles of respecting state sovereignty and non-
interference of internal affairs.134 
 
The way in which the responsibility to protect could be implemented 
under these parameters is unclear.135  China warned that intervention in 
Syria “would have dire consequences for regional security and violate the 
norms governing international relations.”136  China has been clear about its 
 
 131.  John Irish & Bate Felix, France Says EU Countries to Send Troops to C. African Republic, 
REUTERS, Dec. 17, 2013, 4:26 PM EST, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/17/us-
centralafrican-france-idUSBRE9BG0Y020131217. 
 132.  Araud, supra note 130. 
 133.  Jia Qingguo, China, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE EVOLVING ASIAN DEBATE 19, 
21–22 (Watanabe Koji ed., 2003) (noting that Chinese policy opposed international intervention 
because intervention: (1) was driven by Western domination of international affairs and the 
continuation of colonial power structures, (2) lacks political legitimacy, (3) violates the UN Charter, (4) 
is generally a façade for the intervening state’s interests, and (5) is counterproductive and exacerbates 
existing problems). 
 134.  Liu Zhenmin, Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations, Statement at the Plenary Session of 
the General Assembly on the Question of “Responsibility to Protect” (Jul. 24, 2009) (transcript 
available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/Statement%20by%20Ambassador%20Liu%20Zhenmin. 
pdf). 
 135.  Alex de Waal, “My Fears, Alas, Were Not Unfounded”: Africa’s Responses to the Libya 
Conflict, in LIBYA: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE FUTURE OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION,  supra note 65, at 58, 58–61. 
 136.  Obama Advocates Limited Strikes in Syria, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www. 
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belief that intervention absent a Security Council resolution is per se 
illegal.137  Further, it has emphasized that, even with a Security Council 
resolution, intervention violates both the principles of sovereignty and the 
prohibition on the use of force in the UN Charter.138 
E. Russia 
Since the 1990s, Russia has generally acted as a “bulwark of the 
traditional legal order centred on the UN Charter framework. . . . tend[ing] 
to outflank China as the Security Council member most insistent in the 
defence of a pluralist, sovereignty-focused view of international order.”139  
The NATO-led interventions in Kosovo prompted Mikhail Gorbachev to 
decry the NATO agenda as an attempt to “offer the world its military 
intervention in any internal conflict, in exchange for principles of 
international law.”140  Unlike China, however, Russia has occasionally 
supported humanitarian interventions that work through the Security 
Council, as long as the state in crisis can retain veto rights over any 
proposed intervention.141 
After President Obama articulated support for airstrikes in Syria, 
Russia reiterated its opposition to military action absent a Security Council 
authorization.  Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin wrote an editorial in 
the New York Times, seeking the support of the American public against a 
Syrian campaign.142  He argued that the proposed intervention would be 
“unacceptable under the United Nations Charter and would constitute an 
act of aggression.”143  Russia also has traditional ties with and geographic 
proximity to states, such as Iran, Syria, and Serbia.144  These links have 
 
aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/20138295234621459.html. 
 137.  Qingguo, supra note 133, at 22. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  ROY ALLISON, RUSSIA, THE WEST, AND MILITARY INTERVENTION 13 (2013).  Allison further 
notes that this position may reflect Russia’s “relatively weak position [compared to that of the United 
States and NATO] in the distribution of global power.”  Id. at 19. 
 140.  Id. at 56. 
 141.  Id. at 61, 65–66. 
 142.  See Vladimir V. Putin, Op-Ed., A Plea for Caution from Russia: What Putin Has to Say to 
Americans About Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/ 
putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, For Syria, Reliant on Russia for Weapons and Food, Old 
Bonds Run Deep, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/world/middleeast/ 
for-russia-and-syria-bonds-are-old-and-deep.html?pagewanted=all (describing the economic and 
political ties between Russia and Syria); To Russia, with Love, Sept. 18, 2012, 12:17, http://www. 
economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/09/russia-and-serbia (describing the depth of the 
Russian/Serbian relationship). 
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prompted especially strong reactions against perceived U.S. and NATO 
“hegemony” in this region.145 
* * * 
As discussed in the previous sections, the responsibility to protect 
remains controversial among powerful states.  The developing world is also 
divided between states that prioritize traditional notions of sovereignty146 
and those that want the international community to be more involved in 
humanitarian pursuits.147  The Syrian crisis did not foster consensus among 
states and perhaps deepened the divide.  Some commentators argue that the 
lack of international intervention in Syria—over both the use of chemical 
weapons and the staggering civil war civilian death toll—represent 
significant setbacks for the responsibility to protect doctrine.148 
V. DE LEGE LATA: THE STATUS OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
International law is based primarily on treaties and customary 
international law (CIL).  To date, states have not concluded a treaty 
codifying the responsibility to protect.  This section, drawing on the 
examples of state practice in the sections above, considers the legality of 
each under customary international law. 
CIL has two components: state practice and opinio juris sive 
necessitatis (opinio juris).149  In other words, CIL is shown by “a general 
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal 
obligation.”150  State practice is discerned from observing the behavior of 
 
 145.  ALLISON, supra note 139, at 13–14.  Russia views U.S. and NATO efforts to circumvent the 
Security Council as the perpetuation of a hegemonic international order.  Id.  From its perspective, great 
powers (including Russia) should collectively determine norms and rules, similar to the original 
understanding of the UN.  Id. 
 146.  See Edward C. Luck, Sovereignty, Choice and the Responsibility to Protect, in THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 13–14 (Alex J. Bellamy et al. eds., 2011) 
(“[S]ome smaller and developing countries have had reservations about embracing the concept.”). 
 147.  South American and African states (especially those who have been suffered genocide) have 
been vocally supportive.  For a summary of states’ positions, see WORLD FEDERALIST MOVEMENT–
INST. FOR GLOBAL POL’Y, STATE-BY-STATE POSITIONS ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2005) 
[hereinafter STATE-BY-STATE POSITIONS], available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/ 
Chart_R2P_11August.pdf. 
 148.  See, e.g., Stuart Gottlieb, Syria and the Demise of the Responsibility to Protect, NAT’L INT., 
Nov. 5, 2013, http://www.nationalinterest.org/commentary/syria-the-demise-the-responsibility-protect-
9360 (“There is no sugar-coating the damage done to the cause of humanitarian intervention by the 
global wavering over Syria.”). 
 149.  JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS: A PROBLEM-
ORIENTED APPROACH 77–79 (3d ed. 2010). 
 150.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) 
(1987).  The ICJ has also repeatedly endorsed this two-part framework.  See, e.g., Continental Shelf 
O'DONNELL MACRO(DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2014  11:28 PM 
2014] THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 579 
states over time.151  Behavior can include a wide range of activity, such as 
military action, official statements, and voting records in international 
institutions.152  Practice need not be universal but must be “virtually 
uniform” and “extensive and representative.”153  The length of time 
required for state practice to become custom depends on the circumstances; 
the inquiry should focus on the “density” of the practice, not the length.154  
Opinio juris, known as the subjective component of international law, 
reflects the rationale for a state’s behavior.155  It results from a sense of 
legal obligation, not merely one of convenience or courtesy.156  Although 
states may not explicitly reference international law norms when acting, 
opinio juris can be inferred from the nature and circumstances of their 
behavior.157 
The responsibility to protect could be represented in CIL in three 
ways.  First, states may feel that they are legally obligated to protect others 
from atrocities in all cases.  This is a non-starter, however.  If the 
responsibility to protect obligates states to act, then failure to protect should 
trigger legal sanctions,158 which have never been contemplated by the 
international community.  Additionally, if states were legally bound to 
protect, political willpower would not be the determining factor in whether 
intervention occurs. 
Second, states may feel legally authorized under CIL to act when the 
Security Council votes to approve humanitarian intervention.159  Lastly, a 
CIL norm could allow states to intervene without a UN resolution.  These 
 
(Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 27 (June 30); North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den., Ger. v. 
Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 7 (Feb. 20).  But see Maurice Mendelson, The Subjective Element in Customary 
International Law, 66 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 177, 201 (1995) (arguing that evidence of opinio juris is 
“definitely unhelpful” for ascertaining whether customary international law has been created). 
 151.  ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 50–
57 (2013). 
 152.  DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 149. 
 153.  Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A 
Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L. REV. 
RED CROSS 175, 180 (2005). 
 154.  COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT’L LAW, INT’L LAW ASS’N, FINAL REPORT 
OF THE COMMITTEE: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (2000). 
 155.  DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 149. 
 156.  Id. at 79. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  STRAUSS, supra note 90, at 39. 
 159.  CIL dictates the interpretation of the Security Council’s powers and fills in the gaps in the UN 
Charter.  See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 434–502 (June 27) (using CIL to interpret the parameters of self-defense under the UN 
Charter). 
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last two potential grounds for intervention are described below. 
A. Action Through the Security Council’s Chapter VII Powers 
1. State Practice 
Over the past fifteen years, states, scholars, and international 
institutions have published extensively on humanitarian intervention.  
Diplomats have produced agreements such as the World Summit Outcome, 
a product of the largest ever gathering of heads of state.160  Similarly, two 
consecutive Secretaries-General have prioritized effectuating the doctrine 
and have published extensively on its value.161  These documents allocate 
the responsibility to intervene to the Security Council.162  In addition to 
statements and publications, the Security Council has authorized 
humanitarian interventions through its Chapter VII powers.  Although the 
UN Charter restricts Security Council action to threats to “international 
peace and security,”163 this textual limit has not prevented Security Council 
intervention in Libya or the CAR.164 
2. Opinio Juris 
Today, few states challenge the legal authority of the Security Council 
to take action in other states for humanitarian purposes.  Many states that 
do not authorize or support humanitarian intervention have endorsed the 
legality of Security Council-led interventions.  For example, Russia and 
China, strong critics of the responsibility to protect, signed the World 
Summit Outcome and have abstained from voting on or have voted in favor 
of interventions.165  Russia has accepted the legality of Security Council 
action when extreme human rights abuses are occurring, whether the state 
offers permission or not,166 but China has continued to insist that 
 
 160.  UN World Summit Adopts Landmark Outcome Document on Raft of Crucial Issues, UN 
NEWS CENTRE (Sept. 16, 2005), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=15853. 
 161.  See supra notes 22–23, 34–40 and accompanying text. 
 162.  See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
 163.  U.N. Charter art. 39. 
 164.  See supra Part III.B and note 131 and accompanying text. 
 165.  Libya, Mali, and the CAR are examples.  See, e.g., Press Release, Security Council, Security 
Council Grants Year-Long Mandate Extension for United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in 
Central African Republic, U.N. Press Release SC/11264 (Jan. 28, 2014); see also ALLISON, supra note 
139, at 36–37 (detailing Russian support for the intervention in Kuwait).  The Security Council has also 
created an “intervention brigade” to keep the peace in Congo.  U.N. Approves New Forces to Pursue 
Congo’s Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/world/africa/un-
approves-new-force-to-pursue-congos-rebels.html?_r=0. 
 166.  ALLISON, supra note 139, at 69.  Under Putin’s leadership, however, Russian has become less 
supportive of its legality.  Id. at 69–70. 
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humanitarian intervention must respect traditional conceptions of 
sovereignty.167 
B. Unilateral Action Without Security Council Approval 
1. State Practice   
Some state practice supports the legality of the responsibility to 
protect without Security Council authorization.  NATO invoked 
humanitarian considerations when intervening in Kosovo.168  Several states 
joined or supported NATO action.169  Further, the African Union 
Constitutive Act authorizes the Union to intervene in a Member State 
“pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, 
namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”170  Similarly, 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established 
its own Mediation and Security Council to “decide on all matters relating to 
peace and security.”171  Finally, through official statements and legal 
memoranda, the UK, France, and the United States have expressed 
willingness to act outside the Security Council in Syria.172 
Several states, however, including Russia and China, strongly objected 
to NATO actions in Kosovo and to the proposed unilateral intervention in 
Syria.173  The majority of states have rejected unilateral action as a response 
to humanitarian crises.174  Thus, state action with respect to intervention 
without Security Council approval has been inconsistent and seems to fall 
short of the virtual uniformity necessary for recognition as customary 
international law.175 
 
 167.  See infra Part VI.B. 
 168.  See supra Part III.A. 
 169.  See supra Part III.A. 
 170.  Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4(h), adopted July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 171.  Economic Community of West African States, Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security art. 10 (Dec. 10, 1998), 
available at http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=ap101299&lang=en.  The ECOWAS 
Mediation and Security Council can authorize military missions when “serious and massive” human 
rights violations occur or if a rebel group threatens to overthrow a democratically elected government.  
Id. art. 1.  The Protocol requires ECOWAS to inform the Security Council of an intervention but does 
not require a Security Council resolution.  Id. 
 172.  See supra Part IV. 
 173.  See Tisdell, supra note 72. 
 174.  See STATE-BY-STATE POSITIONS, supra note 147. 
 175.  BELLAMY, supra note 19, at 68–70 (describing the inconsistencies in how the responsibility to 
protect has been implemented). 
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2. Opinio Juris 
Some states, such as Belgium and the UK, have explicitly articulated 
legal justifications for humanitarian intervention.  Before NATO bombing 
began, FRY officials filed applications against several NATO countries in 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ).176  While most countries solely 
contested the ICJ’s jurisdiction,177 Belgium addressed the issue of 
humanitarian intervention during oral argument.  Belgium’s representative, 
Professor Ergec, argued that NATO’s actions were consistent with the UN 
Charter because NATO was not acting “against” the territorial integrity of 
the FRY.178  Instead, he maintained that 
 
NATO intervened to protect fundamental values enshrined in the jus 
cogens and to prevent an impending catastrophe . . . .  Thus this is not an 
intervention against the territorial integrity or independence of the 
former Republic of Yugoslavia.  The purpose of NATO’s intervention is 
to rescue a people in peril, in deep distress.179 
 
Thus, according to Belgium, NATO’s bombing campaign did not 
violate the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the Charter.  
Similarly, the UK has outlined a legal framework that supports unilateral 
intervention if it fits into certain parameters.180 
Unilateral intervention, however, is not widely viewed as legally 
authorized under international law.  Many states, including China, believe 
that such intervention would violate international law, not put the state in 
conformity with it.181  A UN-sponsored investigative panel labeled the 
intervention in Kosovo “illegal but legitimate” because NATO did not 
receive Security Council authorization before intervention.182  Further, 
Secretary-General Ban maintains that the “responsibility to protect does not 
alter, indeed it reinforces, the legal obligations of Member States to refrain 
 
 176.  See e.g. Press Release 1999/33, Int’l Court of Justice, The Court Rejects the Request for the 
indication of Provisional Measures Submitted by Yugoslavia and Dismisses the Case (June 2, 1999); 
Press Release 1999/32, Int’l Court of Justice, The Court Rejects the Request for the Indication of 
Provisional Measures Submitted by Yugoslavia, but Remains Seized of the Case (June 2, 1999). 
 177.  See, e.g., Preliminary Objections of the French Republic, Legality of Use of Force 
(Yugoslavia v. Fr.) ¶¶1–3 (July 5, 2000), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/107/10873.pdf; 
Preliminary Objections of the United Kingdom, Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.K.) ¶1.1 
(June 5, 2000), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/113/10883.pdf. 
 178.  Legality of the Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.), Verbatim Record, at 12 (May 10, 1999, 
3:00 p.m.), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/105/4473.pdf. 
 179.  Id. at 11–12. 
 180.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 181.  See supra Part IV.D. 
 182.  KOSOVO REPORT, supra note 61, at 4. 
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from the use of force except in conformity with the Charter.”183 
VI. DE LEGE FERENDA: THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AS A 
CIL NORM 
If effectuated, the responsibility to protect doctrine can serve as the 
basis for states to prevent atrocities and mitigate disaster abroad.  This 
section argues that the Security Council’s capacity to authorize 
humanitarian interventions should be definitively established in CIL.  Thus, 
the responsibility to protect should act as an effective legal tool to prevent 
atrocities, rather than a convenient justification to circumvent international 
law. 
A. Addressing Sovereignty Concerns 
The UN was founded in the wake of the devastation of war and the 
horrors of genocide.  The international community vowed, through 
multilateral cooperation, to prevent such atrocities from occurring again.184  
The Security Council is a product of these aspirations.185  Therefore, 
implementing a doctrine, such as the responsibility to protect, that seeks to 
effectuate these goals should be a priority of the institution. 
Critics of the responsibility to protect argue that traditional notions of 
sovereignty prevent uninvited intrusions into domestic affairs, even if 
widespread atrocities are taking place.186  Yet sovereignty is not and has 
never been an absolute.187  Here the option of humanitarian intervention 
only exists if the state is manifestly failing to protect its citizenry.  Indeed, 
a “sovereign” state that has failed in this most basic duty can hardly 
complain about violations of sovereignty. 
Others condemn the responsibility to protect as too easy to manipulate 
or abuse, arguing that it is merely a platform for states to pursue selfish 
motivations or a thin veil for Western imperialism.188  In the West, some 
critics view humanitarian intervention as impracticable in a post-9/11 
world.189  In response to these criticisms, Bass argues that (1) imperialism 
 
 183.  U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 
(Jan. 12, 2009). 
 184.  U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 1. 
 185.  U.N. Charter pmbl., arts. 1, 7. 
 186.  See supra Parts IV.D–E. 
 187.  See BASS, supra note 4, at 352–56 (arguing that the definition of sovereignty has changed 
throughout history).  Further, Bass maintains that respect for “territorial integrity” often serves as “the 
best argument of the butchers in the Rwandan and Serbian governments.”  Id. at 355. 
 188.  BASS, supra note 4, at 376–82. 
 189.  Id. (describing arguments against humanitarian intervention centered on national security and 
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and humanitarianism should not be equated or blurred, (2) humanitarian 
intervention is possible, even in a world where terrorism and security 
threats are prevalent, and (3) humanitarian intervention can be a part of 
promoting democratic governments and dissuading radicalism.190  Again, 
such concerns are also mitigated by the extreme circumstances required for 
an intervention under the responsibility to protect. 
B. Practical Considerations: Bringing Intervention Back to the Security 
Council 
Currently, powerful states have the resources and incentives to work 
outside the UN system, in violation of international law.  Though Russia 
and China can veto a resolution authorizing humanitarian intervention or 
can threaten to do so, the United States, France, and the UK have acted 
outside the Security Council and have explicitly stated that they believe it 
is in their rights to do so.191  In support of these assertions, former U.S. 
legal advisor Harold Koh and former British Legal Adviser Daniel 
Bethlehem have argued for a broader understanding of permissible uses of 
force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.192  Others believe that the 
procedural unfairness surrounding the P5 in the Security Council allows 
states to pursue illegal but otherwise justified interventions.193  Yet working 
outside the UN undermines the credibility of the international legal 
system’s most stable and powerful body,194 further threatening the 
principles that the UN was founded to promote and protect. 
 
terrorism concerns). 
 190.  Id. at 379–82. 
 191.  See supra Parts IV.A–C. 
 192.  See Daniel Bethlehem, Stepping Back a Moment – The Legal Basis in Favour of a Principle 
of Humanitarian Intervention, EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/stepping-back-a-
moment-the-legal-basis-in-favour-of-a-principle-of-humanitarian-intervention/; Harold Hongju Koh, 
Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part II: International Law and the Way Forward), 
JUST SECURITY (Oct. 10, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/02/koh-syria-part2/. 
 193.  See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Does It Matter If US Intervention in Syria Violates the UN Charter?, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 8, 2013, 6:38 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/09/08/matter-us-
intervention-syria-violates-un-charter/. 
 194.  See Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Op-Ed., On Syria, a U.N. Vote Isn’t Optional, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/04/opinion/on-syria-a-un-vote-isnt-
optional.html?_r=0 (questioning whether “employing force to punish Mr. Assad’s use of chemical 
weapons is worth endangering the fragile international order that is World War II’s most significant 
legacy”); see also PAUL F.J. ARANAS, SMOKESCREEN: THE U.S., NATO AND THE ILLEGITIMATE USE OF 
FORCE 143–50 (2012) (describing how violations of the UN Charter by powerful states, such as the 
United States, undermine the legitimacy of the UN as an institution). 
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VII.  A FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM 
Past failures and the limitations of the current system demonstrate the 
need for reform and a framework to decide when an intervention should 
take place under the responsibility to protect.  This section advocates for 
such a framework. 
A. What Situations? 
As Deng articulated in the conception of the doctrine, the 
responsibility to protect is the original duty of the host state.  Only a failure 
of this duty can trigger international oversight. 
When the state fails this duty, under circumstances described below, 
the international community is authorized, but not obligated, to act.195  
Facially, this construction creates tension with a responsibility to protect 
and prompts theoretical questions of whether humanitarian intervention is a 
right or a duty.196  While the conceptualization of the responsibility as a 
general duty has great force, current realities counsel a more flexible 
approach.  Practically speaking, an obligation to protect is unlikely to 
garner the necessary support to be implemented.  Additionally, this 
framework provides a baseline in hopes that, after successful humanitarian 
interventions, a sense of obligation will begin to coalesce.  Eventually, this 
sense of obligation may form opinio juris. 
The crimes must be of a severity and type that warrant international 
attention.  Consensus has emerged around four crimes: genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.197  In addition, the 
international community’s response to unsuccessful appeals to the 
 
 195.  See, e.g., ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT 25–26 (2011) (describing the position that the word “responsibility” does not impose 
obligations for states but rather confers authority).  This position was articulated in “Dear Colleague” 
letters sent to the 190 other participants of the World Summit.  See, e.g., Letter from John R. Bolton, 
U.S. Ambassador to United Nations, to UN Member States 2 (Aug. 30, 2005), available at 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/US_Boltonletter_R2P_30Aug05[1].pdf (relaying U.S. 
amendments to the draft Outcome Document being prepared for the High-Level Event on the 
Responsibility to Protect).  Ambassador Bolton stated that the United States does not believe that the 
United Nations has “an obligation to intervene under international law. . . .  [UN Action] should depend 
on the specific circumstances.  Accordingly, we should avoid language that focuses on the obligation or 
responsibility of the international community and instead assert that we are prepared to take action.”  Id.  
These changes are largely reflected in the World Summit Outcome.  See generally G.A. Res. 60/1, 
supra note 30. 
 196.  See JAMES PATTISON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION & THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
15–20 (2010) (comparing duties and rights arguments and concluding that sufficiently legitimate states 
have a general, unassigned duty to intervene, which translates into an assigned duty for the most 
legitimate state). 
 197.  G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 30. 
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responsibility to protect seemingly imposes two additional requirements on 
situations involving these four crimes: “(1) a requirement that the use of 
coercion be preceded by compelling evidence of genocide or mass 
atrocities; (2) a relatively narrow interpretation of ‘crimes against 
humanity’ that excludes crimes not associated with the deliberate killing 
and displacement of civilians.”198  These requirements ensure that only the 
most egregious human rights violations are addressed.  The international 
community does not possess the political will or resources to intervene in 
every human rights violation. 
B. Process 
The interests of the international community are best served if 
enforcement action decisions are made in the Security Council, but it has 
ineffectively addressed severe human rights violations.  These reforms 
could confront the deadlock that has plagued the Security Council in crises 
like those in Syria, Darfur, and Kosovo. 
1. A UN agency should be established to determine if one of the four 
crimes above has taken place and if diplomatic solutions have been 
exhausted or would be ineffective 
When a state or group of states intervenes in another state, the motives 
of the intervening states are questioned.  Ascertaining a state’s “true” 
motive for any behavior is difficult, however.  Often, several factors guide 
a state’s behavior, such that “humanitarian motives may be genuine but 
may be only one part of a larger constellation of motivations driving state 
action.”199  Transferring the responsibility to an independent agency could 
alleviate some of these motive-based concerns by ensuring that a legitimate 
basis for intervention exists. 
This agency, established by the Secretary-General, would collect 
evidence to determine whether one of the four actionable violations has 
occurred.  Definitions of the relevant human rights violations are well 
established by treaties200 and jus cogens.201  An investigation could be 
initiated (1) at the request of a General Assembly member, (2) by the 
 
 198.  BELLAMY, supra note 19, at 69. 
 199.  Martha Finnemore, Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention, in THE CULTURE OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS 153, 158 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 
1996). 
 200.  See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
 201.  See generally RAFAEL NIETO-NAVIA, INTERNATIONAL PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) 
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2001), available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ 
WritingColombiaEng.pdf. 
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Secretary-General, or (3) by the agency itself.  UN members would be 
obligated to grant the agency technological assistance, monetary support, 
and safe passage.  Further, member states would be obligated to cooperate 
fully with any investigation. 
2. If this agency found compelling evidence of an actionable violation, 
it would issue a recommendation of action to the Security Council and the 
General Assembly. 
An independent agency could also address the political will problems 
that doomed the interventions in Darfur and Rwanda.  If the agency were to 
determine that genocide or a mass atrocity were occurring, the Security 
Council would likely face international and domestic pressure to act.  
Additionally, the General Assembly would have access to the report and 
could further pressure Security Council action. 
In democratic states, three institutions create pressure: “a free press, 
free civil society, and governments that respond to public opinion.”202  
Mass media has played a significant role in increasing public awareness of 
human rights crises, thus acting as a “crucial first step toward a 
humanitarian intervention.”203  A finding of genocide from a credible, 
independent UN agency would intensify the attention and scrutiny of 
international media.  Such scrutiny would ramp up public pressure for 
action.  Russia and China, however, remain insulated from these 
pressures.204  To respond to this political insulation and lack of will to act, 
France has suggested that P5 states formally or informally agree to refrain 
from vetoing resolutions aimed at stopping human rights abuses.205  Given 
Russian and Chinese distrust of Western-led interventions, this concession, 
though perhaps desirable, is highly unlikely. 
The establishment of an agency can still serve several important 
functions, however.  It can cement the status of the responsibility to protect 
as a CIL norm.  States can further discuss desirable parameters for 
intervention and alleviate concerns of Western imperialism.  Additionally, 
 
 202.  BASS, supra note 4, at 28. 
 203.  Id. at 25. 
 204.  See, e.g., REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, WORLD PRESS FREEDOM INDEX 2013 (2013), 
available at http://fr.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/classement_2013_gb-bd.pdf.  The report describes how Russia’s 
free press ranking (148 out of 179 countries) “has fallen again because, since Vladimir Putin’s return to 
the presidency, repression has been stepped up . . . .  The country also continues to be marked by the 
unacceptable failure to punish all those who have murdered or attacked journalists.”  Id. at 5.  The 
report also details that China, which ranks 173 out of 179, “still refuse[s] to grant [its] citizens the 
freedom to be informed.  The control of news and information is a key issue for [China], which [is] 
horrified at the prospect of being open to criticism.”  Id. at 10. 
 205.  See Ripert Statement, supra note 127. 
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supplying monetary support and focusing international attention on human 
rights violations could both increase political pressure to respond and even 
inspire change on the ground. 
CONCLUSION 
The responsibility to protect could be a valuable tool for preventing 
widespread human rights violations.  When atrocities occur, the legitimacy 
and purposes of the UN and international law are best served by having 
intervening states work through the UN system.  Establishing a framework 
for action through an independent UN agency could help the responsibility 
to protect bridge the gap between legitimacy and legality in humanitarian 
intervention.  Bridging this gap is not only important for international law 
and the UN system but also for protecting potential victims of human rights 
abuses. 
 
